American History

War, with all its economic and physical depravities, is often easy to start but exceedingly difficult to end.  So opines James McPherson in his article,  No Peace Without Victory, 1861-1865, The American Historical Review, Vol. 109, No. 1 (February 2004), pp. 1-18.  McPherson writes in his opening salvo, For at least the past two centuries, nations have found it harder to end a war than to start one (1).  Indeed, McPherson presents a clear and cogent argument that, despite apparent interest on all sides during military engagement to resolve conflict by peaceful means (and indeed despite foreign interest as well in negotiating such peace to coincide with independent foreign interests,,) negotiations often fail to end wars.  Only actual defeat or victory can stop the bloodshed.

In making the point that actual victory is often required for resolution of war, McPherson concentrates upon the American Civil War and the events that transpired off the battle fields during the years ranging from1861 to1865.  At issue in the war was the question of succession.  In such a question there could only be one winner  either the South succeeded and became its own nation, or the South gave up its bid for independence and remained part of the United States.  Defeat would blot the Confederate States of America from the face of the earth. Confederate victory would destroy the United States and create a precedent for further balkanization of the territory once governed under the Constitution of 1789. (1).

While McPherson outlines the attempts made by both the Confederate and Union governments to negotiate a peace, he makes clear that both sides understood that resolution of the conflict was possible only by one side admitting defeat.

The American Civil War could not end with a negotiated peace because the issues over which it was foughtUnion versus Disunion, Freedom versus Slaveryproved to be non-negotiable. . . the Confederate government would have been happy to bring the Civil War to an end . . . for a negotiated treaty with the United States would have constituted de jure as well as de facto recognition of Confederate sovereignty as a separate nation. For that reason, the Lincoln administration refused to consider formal negotiations as a means to end the war.

Indeed, the author presents the idea that efforts at negotiation appear to have been engendered merely as a ruse designed to appease the population.  McPherson indicates by his use of examples that indeed, peace negotiations are often merely a smokescreen used in response to journalistic intervention to seek populace support.  For instance, McPherson writes

Lincoln did not believe for a moment that the Confederate agents had genuine negotiating powers.  And even if they did, the Union president knew that his Southern counterparts inflexible condition for peace was Confederate independence.  Yet, given the despondent Northern mood, Lincoln could not appear to rebuff any peace overture, however spurious. (7-8).

From the South, an equally unbelieving Davis made spurious attempts at peace.  Davis decided to meet with them because, like Lincoln, he had to consider the desire for peace among his own people and could not appear to spurn any opportunity for negotiations. (9).  However, upon hearing Lincolns repeated offer of amnesty and terms Davis replied, Amnesty, Sir, applies to criminals.  We have committed no crime.  At your door lies all the misery . . . .We will govern ourselves . . . if we have to see every Southern plantation sacked, and every Southern city in flames. (Gilmore, James R., Atlantic Monthly 8 (September 1864) 37283, qtd. in McPherson 10).

McPhersons article presents as social history, with arguments raised by reference to little-known historical facts, such as the intervention of newspapers in engineering both the government and the populaces responses.  For example, McPherson writes that one Democratic newspaper wrote scathingly of Lincolns policies to some success.  Never mind that no such proposition existed Democratic newspapers convinced thousands of Northern voters that the South would have accepted such a proposition  . . . the New York Herald . . . opined that Lincoln had signed his political death warrant . . . . (11).  The author takes a behind-the-scenes look at the political underpinnings of the steps taken to either win andor end the war.  While important battles are mentioned, such as the Battle of Antietam, the Battle of Perryville, the capture of Fort Fisher in North Carolina (4,14), the thrust of the article focuses on the individuals involved in the decision-making at the time, both government elected officials, foreign officials, and journalists.

McPherson utilizes both primary and secondary sources in establishing his viewpoint.  Indeed, it is his heavy reliance upon primary sources, such as the newspaper articles and personal writings, and his interpretation thereon, that makes his article both fascinating and intellectually compelling.  Rather than merely restating the opinions of other historians, Mr. McPherson has evaluated the actual contemporaneous writings and the resultant facts to present the reader with an engaging and socially important message.  Battles become mere footnotes to the important behind-the-scenes maneuvering of individuals.  Indeed, this article could present in a modern-day study of the Middle-East peace negotiations just as easily as it could to in an examination of historical events.

In the end, the article is well-reasoned, well-presented and fascinating, both as a summary of history and as a commentary on the social underpinnings of war.    

McPherson states that the French and British governments believed that their nations had a large stake in the American Civil War.  For example, Emperor Napoleon IIIs intervention in Mexicos civil war would fare better with a divided United States that could not readily enforce the Monroe Doctrine.  Similarly, Englands interests were involved because both the Union naval blockade and the Confederate contracts for the building of warships in English shipyards affected Englands commercial prosperity.   Further, the Confederate states were responsible for furnishing 75 of the cotton utilized by the textile industries in both France and England (1-2).

These developments reopened the question of foreign mediation. The semi-official government newspaper in Paris, the Constitutionnel, urged Northern leaders to listen at last to the voice of humanity and accept mediation to end a war disastrous to the interests of humanity.