Operation Eagle Claw-The Failed 1980 Iranian Hostage Rescue
The Iranian government accepted to release the American hostages a day after the ascension of President Ronald Reagan into power, an estimated 444 days of captivity (Barbour, 2009). According to the investigation report on the operation failure compiled by retired Chief of Naval Operations Admiral James L. Holloway III, the failure was a sign of inadequacy in the planning, control and inter-service coordination in the mission (Peterson Burns, 2005). The recommendations on the report led to a number of changes in the department of defense as well as the enactment of the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 (Slate Anderson, 2003). This essay is a discussion on the failed 1980 Operation Eagle Claw. In particular, the author takes a look at the events which led to the operation, the operation itself, and its aftermath.
First is a discussion on the events which led to the Operation Eagle Claw. The Operation Eagle Claw was triggered by the failure of the American government to rescue its hostages in Tehran through diplomacy (Kamps, 2006). According to history, the Shah of Iran regime was overthrown by an Islamic theocracy under the leadership of the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini in late 1970s, a move that led Shah to leave the country. Later, the American government allowed Shah to enter America for cancer treatment. However, a move by the Carter administration not to allow for Shahs return to Iran triggered a diplomatic crisis between the two nations (Tristam, 2010).
Following this misunderstanding between the two nations, students militants seized the American embassy compound in Tehran on November 1979 (Trahair, 2004). During this invention, the militants held an estimated 66 Americans hostage. The militants however conducted selective release of the hostages reducing the number to 52. The use of diplomatic approach in solving the problem did not yield any fruits as Khomeini was not cooperative. As per the claims by many political analysts, Khomeini wanted to use this to tarnish the reputation of Carters administration, a strategy that effectively worked (Tristan, 2010). This is because the hostages were never release until the assertion of President Ronald in 1982 444 days after the hostages were captured.
Due to diplomatic failure in resolving the problem, President Jimmy Carter opted for engaging in a military rescue mission. However, this operation was compromised by the lack of joint special operations command for executing the mission (Trahair, 2004). This led to the establishment of a special planning cell under the Special Operations Division by the secretary of state (Trahair, 2004). According to the team of planers, the Operation Eagle Claw was to be a two night operation. The planning and training process took an estimated over five months.
Nevertheless, it has been claimed by some military analysts that the failure of the mission was due to poor planning. This is because according to available recorded information, the American army lacked qualified personnel with experience for working under sand storm conditions (Barbour, 2009). Another reason given is that contrary to military provisions, all the pilots in the mission were from the marine naval. This meant that they lacked experience of flying long distances over land while on night vision glasses.
Second is a discussion on the events which took place during the operation. The execution of the Operation Eagle Claw started on the 24th day of April 1980 at around 7p.m. with the eight helicopters and EC-130 refuelers departing from Nimitz in Indian Ocean, an estimated 60 miles from the coast of Iran (Barbour, 2009). According to available information on the incidence, only the rescue force, equipment and fuel were delivered to desert one as was planned as MC-130E Combat Talons and EC-130Es flew without mechanical problems (Tristam, 2010). The MC-130E signed dragon 1 had some landing problem that saw notable wing damage, but no body was injured and the Talon remained flyable (Tristam, 2010).
The dragon aircraft off-loaded the combat control team who acted to create a landing zone for the helicopters to the north of the dirty road by installing TACAN beacons for guiding the safe landing of the helicopters. This was followed by the landing of dragon two and three, which were calling more Delta Force Operator (Tristam, 2010). Due to the small size of the desert one, dragon 1 and 2 were forced to leave as a way of providing enough space for the landing of EC-130Es and helicopters.
Nevertheless, the helicopters were faced with various problems. While flying in the desert, Bluebeard 6 received a sensor indicator which signified that it had a cracked rotor blade. This prompted its landing and abandonment in the desert with its crew using other helicopters (Barbour, 2009). Another problem that affected the flights was a sandstorm, which saw the loss of other two helicopters (Bluebeard 1 and 8) prior to arriving in desert one. Still, the sandstorm has also been attributed to the estimated 50 minutes delaying in landing by the helicopter.
Although Bluebeard 5 had almost made it safely through the sandstorm, it abandoned the mission and went back to the Nimitz. This was after its fight control instrumentation compromised its capabilities of navigating without visual reference points. It has also been established that the Bluebeard 2 helicopter landed in desert one but had sustained mechanical problems in its second-stage hydraulics system (Trahair, 2004). Just to be appreciated here is the fact that this hydraulic system is responsible for powering the automatic flight control as well as some part of the primary flight control.
The crew therefore was left with only five helicopters for transporting their servicemen and equipment to desert two. This led to what seemingly became a stalemate among the commanders. This can be explained by the fact that the commander in charge of the helicopter saw Bluebeard 2 as a threat and thus refused to continue with it to desert two. On the other side, Beckwith, who was in charge of the rescue force declined to reduce the size of the force. This is a clear indication that the operation was made with conflict of interest and poor coordination, a factor which contributed much in overseeing its failure (Trahair, 2004). Beckwith failed to appreciate intelligence from the Canadian diplomatic sources, which warned that the Sea Stallions could eminently fail to start in such a cold weather, an element, which later resulted into the shutting down of the helicopters for almost 24 hours in desert two thus forcing the crew to opt for abortion of the mission.
After the abortion of the Operation Eagle Claw mission, the crew was faced with a problem of fuel. This is because of the extra idling time that had been spent in the mission. This forced Republic 4 as well as Bluebeard 4 to leave immediately so as to make it to the refueling track before running out of fuel. Bluebeard 3 on the other side moved directly behind EC-130 but could not be moved by a ground taxi, making it only to fly a short distance at low speed and attitude. Due to this reason it was sandblasted when its rotor crashed with desert sand compromising its reliability. Bluebeard 4 on the other hand crashed into the root wing of the EC-130 after striking its vertical stabilizer (Barbour, 2009).
Owing to the explosion that resulted from the crashing, eight servicemen died on the spot leaving only the pilot and the co-pilot surviving burn with serious burns (Kamps, 2006). In reaction to this incidence, the other crew attempted to rescue some of the important documents as well as destroy the helicopter, a move that failed after Beckwith ordered them into the C-130s (Kamps, 2006). This is a proof that the Iranian nation benefited from five RC-53 helicopters as all had sustained minimal damages. Therefore, the Operation Eagle Claw mission was indeed a big failure for the American military department. This has been closely attributed to poor planning, controlling and coordination of the mission.
Third is a discussion on the aftermath of the Operation Eagle Claw mission. Following announcement by the white house that the mission had failed, the Iranian government reacted by scattering the American hostages in different regions as a way of compromise the success of any possible second rescue attempt (Barbour, 2009). Still, according to investigation reports by the Iranian government on the Operation Eagle Claw rescue mission, there were nine dead bodies with one being an Iranian civilian. This was a source of critic for the contradictory statements from the white house which claimed that there were Iranian casualties.
The failure of the Operation Eagle Claw mission served as an eye opener for the American government in appreciating the importance of having its various services work in cohesion (Slate Anderson, 2003). Indeed, this is the main reason behind the formation of the United States Special Operations Command. According to the provisions of this special operations command, every service has established its own special operation forces and command procedures. Also, owing to the success functioning of the MC-130, the Air Force special ops units were given AF Outstanding Unit Award for two consecutive years. Still, these units were given the HH-53 Pave Low helicopters transferred to their jurisdiction particularly for operations involving long distances and low level flights at night (Calmer, 1987).
The availability of an effectively trained, qualified and highly reliable personnel in any organization is quite crucial for its sustainable success. The failure of the Operation Eagle Claw mission was closely perceived as due to lack of trained pilots for flying long distances while on night vision glasses (Peterson Burns, 2005). Due to this reason, the US government founded the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (SOAR) whose main function is to train army pilots for low level flight mission operations. Having implementing some substantial changes in the operation of the various serves to mitigate another failure, a second rescue operation under the name Project Honey Badger was authorized (Peterson Burns, 2005).
Although many plans and training exercises were conducted in connection with the second rescue mission, it was established that the mission was increasingly becoming costly. This is due to its large number of servicemen and aircrafts required (Barbour, 2009). Still, the planning required the transportation of a 12-ton bulldozer for allowing effective clearing of any blocked runway. This was further complicated by the failure of one helicopter during the first training session, a factor that led to the concept of using an only fixed-wing STOL aircraft which has the capability of flying direct from US to Iran while on aerial refueling mechanism.
Another concept which was tried during the second rescue plan was the Operation Credible Sport. This served to modify the YMC-130H by outfitting it with rocket thrusters fore and rare, a development that will improve its short landing and take-off capability (Tristan, 2010). However, dispute the development of this concept, it was never implemented. Still, modification of three aircrafts on a rushed secret program which saw the crashing of the first aircraft during demonstration after the pilot fired its landing braking rockets. Though all crew members survived, the project was abandoned by the white house. Despite this failure of the project, analysts have claimed that such attempts formed a crucial basis for the development of the United States Special Operations Command initiative (Calmer, 1987).
In the meantime, President Carter continued engaging the Iranian government on negotiation in is efforts to oversee the release of the hostages. Carter was however not successful in realizing the release as it was only after the election of president Ronald Reagan that the Iranian government decided to release the American hostages, after staying in captivity for 444 days (Calmer, 1987). Another important development after the failure of the Operation Eagle Claw mission is the recommendations given in the Chief of Naval Operations Admiral James L. Holloway III led investigation of 1980 into the mission (Calmer, 1987).
According to the investigation report, Chief of Naval Operations Admiral James L. Holloway III cited a number of reasons for the failure of the mission. First, the planning of the mission was marked with many deficiencies as it was conducted secretively thus limiting the contributions of qualified personnel (Peterson Burns, 2005). Command and control was another problem. In the military service, unified command is quite important for overseeing the successful completion of any mission. The report thus saw the need for the establishment of an effective method of ensuring reliable inter-service operability (Kamps, 2006). This report is to be thanked for various changes in the US Department of Defense as well as the enactment of the Goldwater-Nichols Act in 19876. Lastly, a memorial for those who lost their lives in the operation was established in Arlington National Cemetery.
Failure by President Carter to have the American hostages released was a sign of failed diplomatic engagements between the two nations. According to available information, it is quite clear that the Iranian leadership of the time had engaged its resources in ensuring an embarrassment to Carters leadership (Tristam, 2010). Indeed, this is exactly what happened as failure by Carter to secure freedom for the hostages made him loose the general election. Such can also be supported by the fact that it was just after the inauguration of President Ronald Reagan as the new president of the states that Iran unconditionally released the hostages.
In conclusion, it has been evidently established that the Operation Eagle Claw-The Failed 1980 Iranian Hostage Rescue by the American government was due to a number of reasons. First was lack of experienced and reliable aircraft pilots. This is because all the helicopter pilots in the mission were from the marine naval and lacked experience in flying long distances of land while on night vision goggles (Barbour, 2009). Another reason was poor command and control as well as effective inter-service operability as each service seemed to work independently during the mission (Peterson Burns, 2005).
According to historical information on the Operation Eagle Claw, it is clear that despite confirmation by American military that flying at slightly below 3,000 feet could be enough to avoid radar detection, the operation commands decided to fly below 200 feet (Peterson Burns, 2005). Due to this, they faced the problem of sandstorms. Lastly, the mission lacked proper planning as it did not take into consideration the weather condition in the Iranian nation as a reason for selecting the right type of aircraft to use (Barbour, 2009). Therefore, an effective military operation should be based on informed decisions as well as reliable coordination among the various teams involved.
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