American History

Institution Civil War Battles
The American Civil War is one of the bloodiest conflicts ever fought in American history.  It was bloody in the sense that both sides, the Union and the Confederacy had a very high casualty rate throughout the 4-year conflict.  Part of it was attributed to the way commanders managed their troops from the strategic level down to the tactical level.  The strategic level represents the big picture on how the war was fought and the Civil War saw a gradual shift from the Napoleonic of maneuver warfare to attrition warfare where quantity has the edge and the side that runs out of resources, material or human, loses.  If this were to be the sole factor, the North would have the edge in terms of population.
Callous as it may sound, it can be inferred that the North can afford to lose more men in the battlefield and this was pretty much evident in the tactics used which entailed meeting the enemy in the field of battle to form a line made up of ranks of soldiers.  During the Civil War, the principal combat arm was the infantry.  They were the ones who practically did all the fighting and would win or lose battles. They were formed into various combinations from battles lines to columns depending on their strength (number).  They would face down the enemy which could be similarly arrayed and they would fire at each other in formation until the ranks of one side would thin and they would retreat while the other would charge.   Battle lines could deliver the firepower either defensively and offensively. Offensive firepower alone would not ensure success and as mentioned earlier, thinning ranks did not necessarily mean a particular side was losing.  The unit on the offensive would charge, fixed bayonets, and massed columns, with their greater depth, were often preferable to battle lines for making frontal assaults which was very effective if the ranks of the opposing side was thinned down from the initial exchange of volleys.  Frontal assaults were not the only tactics employed both sides also made use of flank attacks, to roll up thin battle lines. On the offense, tacticians sought to find an opportunity for such effective flank attacks by probing for it for it was the weakest part of the battle line On the defensive side, they countered by putting up impassable barriers. In either posture, commanders try coordinate all their troops to deliver maximum firepower and to avoid being decimated piecemeal (McWhiney  Jamieson, 1982, p.67).

This was the case in several battles such as Bull Run, Fredericksburg and Antietam.  In the case of Antietam or Sharpsburg, the Union Army lost more men than the Confederates despite checking the Confederate advance and considering it a victory for them though it was costly.  McClellan, the overall commander of the Union forces had the numerical advantage but his management of his army proved to be his undoing as he squandered the advantage he had his forces charge headlong into General Lees center which was heavily defended and the latter also made good use of the terrain.  The problem here was that McClellan was too accustomed to defensive tactics and he failed to make optimum use of his men by sending them in a futile frontal assault rather than taking the time to find Lees weak spots it took General Burnside to save the battle, resulting in the Confederate retreat.

This was also the case in the Battle of Murfreesboro, Tennessee between the forces of Generals Bragg (Confederate) and Rosecrans (Union).  Bragg took the offensive by launching successive lines against the dig-in Union troops.  This was the same tactic he used in earlier battles like Chancellorsville which gave the Confederates victory.  Unfortunately the tactic did not work here as the terrain and vegetation negated the main effort and were soundly beaten one after the other until Bragg was forced to retire from battle to hand the Union a victory here.  It can be inferred here that the Confederates tried to use attrition warfare here sending wave upon wave of troops only to have them decimated (McWhiney  Jamieson, 1982, pp.85-87,117).

In the battles of Fredericksburg and Gettysburg, both sides, when on the defensive, erected breastworks or made use of the terrain or natural features to preserve their ranks while making it easy for them to decimate the enemy that maintained formation while forming a firing line or charging at them.  In Fredericksburg, a Union brigade made up of Irish immigrants charged up a Confederate position at Maryes Hill which was well defended as the troops, also made up of Irish immigrants held the line and repelled the Union attack by making use of the stone wall.  At Gettysburg, both sides committed troops to the offensive which saw them suffer heavy casualties as they also employed the same tactics as in previous battles.  The Union appeared to be beleaguered here but the troops stood fast and made use of the terrain and dug in and were able to hold off successive Confederate offensives, especially the charge by General Pickett which proved to be costly from out of the 13,000 men who charged, barely half of them made it back to their lines, a testament to the formidable defense put up by the Union and a tactical error on the part of Pickett as Union forces also brought artillery into play that contributed to the heavy casualties.  In this case, he tried to wage attrition warfare, trying to overwhelm the apparently dwindling Union forces but underestimated their defences which resulted in heavy casualties (McWhiney  Jamieson, 1982, p.72-74).

One must not also forget the other combat arms that complement the infantry  artillery and mounted cavalry.  On open fields, they help determine the outcome of the battle.  Artillery was usually employed first to soften up enemy troops either by decimating the ranks of the infantry or performing counterbattery fire where they would fire in the general direction of enemy artillery positions. Most battles saw both sides made full use of artillery for these purposes and infantry charges at artillery positions proved costly unless the latter was close enough to be overrun and were well-defended or fortified.  At Bull Run, J.E.B. Stuarts cavalry helped complete the rout of the Union forces after the steadfast stand of Stonewall Jacksons forces.  They are often held in reserve and not committed too soon in open field battle, not while enemy artillery was still in play.  They had to wait until enemy artillery positions were overrun or neutralized before they made their move (McWhiney  Jamieson, 1982, p.117).

Despite the significant role played by artillery and cavalry inmost battles, their effectiveness had limitations.  The difficult terrain helped relegate cavalry and artillery to lesser tactical roles. Another factor that needed to be taken into consideration was the widespread use of long-range rifled shoulder arms or repeating rifles. As recently as the Napoleonic and Mexican Wars, when most infantry fired smoothbore muskets, cavalry and artillery had been considered the vital attacking arms vital to victory and without them, no infantry unit could win they help tip the balance in favor of their side. The continuation of these tactics in the Civil War proved disastrous, as infantry rifle power soon drove cavalrymen off the battlefield and relegated artillery to defensive support rather than support offensives. This was made possible by importing various rifles from Europe which proved to be more sophisticated compared to the muskets they were using.

Rifle power, having the advantage of speed and accuracy of the delivery of ordnance to the enemy, devastated offensive infantry assaults, especially when handled by capable soldiers who could get off 2 to 3 shots in a minute and under fire.  Complementing these rifles were repeating rifles that were breechloaders and proved to be easier and faster to reload compared to the muzzle-loaders used by regular infantry units (Mahon, 1961, 57-59).  This deadly combination also proved very effective to the ones wielding them and fatal to those on the receiving end of it.

By 1864, infantry customarily put up light field fortifications to enhance its defensive battlefield positions and protect itself from enemy rifle power which proved to be effective from the previous tactic of standing in ranks and hoping not to get hit in the initial volley the breastworks increased their chances of survival. However, when on the offensive, whether against battle lines or fortifications, infantry continued suffering heavy casualties as commanders continued (foolishly or stubbornly) employing Napoleonic era tactical formations outmoded by technology.  It can be inferred here that commanders assumed they had a lot of men to commit and sacrifice in order to accomplish the missions they drew up.  Yet in doing so, they took for granted these other factors. Most Civil War commanders took the Napoleonic approach to victory as the commanders at the time lived and studied Napoleons battle tactics, but few came close to achieving it. But the problem here was warfare had so changed for a long time that victory in the Civil War would instead come through strategy. Within that strategy, it took a series of battles and the tactics through which they were fought to determine victory and defeat and these were the crucial elements that formed part of the overall strategy by the commanders.  It can also be said that some commanders, particularly on the Union side could afford to lose more men given the population of the Union compared to the South, especially since the latter did not use blacks to form their army.  They were hoping that quantity or outnumbering the enemy would win but earlier battles proved them wrong as their numerically superior forces were defeated in several battles beginning with Bull Run which underscored problems or weaknesses in command and control.  It was only by luck that they were able to win in battles like Antietam and Gettysburg as the Confederates retired from battle as they could not sustain their momentum and could not match the depth of Union strength in numbers.

In terms of  attrition fighting, the Union won over the Confederates.  The South could barely muster more men to join their ranks compared to the Union.  It also did not help that technology tipped the scales further with the Union as they introduced better weapons which were the fruits of their industrial might and could afford to import more.  It was only in the latter part of the war that competent commanders such as Generals Grant and Sherman were able to utilize these assets and secure Union victory for the war in 1865.