American History

It was in November 1943 when the allied troops finally landed in Morocco and Algeria for the operation torch. These landings combined with the lieutenant general Bernard Montgomerys triumph during the Second Battle of El Alamein positioned Italian and German troops in Libya and Tunisia in a shaky state. In an attempt to avert the forces which were under Field Marshal Erwin Rommel from being eliminated, backups were immediately transferred from Sicily to Tunisia. On November 8, 1942, the military forces of the United States and United Kingdom initiated an operation against the French North Africa particularly the French-controlled territories in Morocco and Algeria. The landing, which was referred to as Torch, mirrored the consequences of long, contentious disagreements between American and British planners regarding the prospected course of an Allied strategy. The arguments were at last stilled by the intercession of Franklin D. Roosevelt, the American president. In a direct and indirect logic, the impact of Operation Torch was gigantic on the course of Anglo-American strategy throughout the rest of the war it could have become the most imperative strategic resolution that the Allied leaders would make. Actually this operation inevitably deferred the landing in France till 1944 though at the same time it also allowed United States to finish the mobilization of its huge manpower and industrial resources for the titanic air and ground battles that described the 1944 Allied campaigns.

The onset of the war
The fighting in Kasserine Pass started in 1942, December when the Tunisia -German commander- Jurgen Von Arnim of the German V Panzer Army initiated an attack west as an effort towards linking up with the army of Rommel which was retreating from southern Tunisia and Libya. Arnims goal was to control Dorsale which is a mountain range is extending southwards from Tunis. In so doing, Arnim would also be able to rule over the mountain passes which restricted movement via east of Dorsale. If he accomplished this, Arnim would push Eisenhower to using passes like the pass at Kasserine. Kasserine pass used to be further south. As a result, the Eisenhowers men would be pushed further from their supplies and at the same time let Rommel and Arnim combine together their forces. Theoretically, the north Africa Axis forces should have gone at a loss mainly due to the inability of Germans to sufficiently supply their individual forces. However, they had a big advantage in comparison to the Allies since they had a command structure which was much unified it was absolutely clear who was in command of German forces in Tunisia. However, the Allies were in a total mess

Theoretically, Eisenhower had total power over the Allied forces. Conversely, he was stationed in Algiers which is 400 miles further from the battle front in Tunisia. Eisenhower selected Major-General Lucien Truscott as his area representative. Truscott also stationed himself at Constantine, another 200 miles away from the forefront. The real daily command was done by General Sir Kenneth Anderson (Lieutenant), the commander of the first British Army. Anderson faced great difficulty. A fraction of his force- the Nineteenth French Corps headed by Koeltz, could only take his orders from a commanding officer of French forces, General Alphonse Juin. Juin in turn got his instructions from General Henri Giraud. The French were still bitter about the attack by the British on Mers el Kbir. Attempting to calm down the French, Anderson Kenneth had wished to give them sectors in Tunisia save for the circumstances in the area which did not permit him to accomplish this. Andersons condition worsened because he never went along with the superior American commanding officers attached to his own force. They found him to be aloof and cold. The II United States Corps was headed by Major General Lloyd Fredendall. He had an individual hate for Anderson Kenneth and he had some confidence in the Koeltzs men.

On January 1943, Arnim invaded the French places with huge success. Eisenhower decided to remove the French troops to places in the backside and substitute them with lately arrived troops from American. Prior to this, Arnim hit again on 30th January and assaulted more French troops and succeeded equally. By February 1943, he had acquired his bridgehead in Tunisia and at the same time gave Rommel a protected enclave. By February, Arnim authorized approximately 100,000 men, and Rommel had about 70,000 men within his charge. In entirety, the Allies had approximately 150,000 men in the entire region.

On 4th February, Rommel recommended to Arnim that he ought to carry on with his hostile attacks on the Allies whereas Arnim would do likewise further south. During this time, the Nazi Germany had been shocked by the surrender of German VI Army at Stalingrad. Subsequently a chief conquest in North Africa could go far in restoring this defeat. Furthermore, following a withdrawal in North Africa, a triumph would reinstate Rommels reputation, particularly because he had realized that he would be taken back to Germany due to ill-health. Then all of a sudden, and in a way not fully known still, Allied acumen informed Anderson that they were precisely aware of what Rommel and Arnim were planning to do, a main assail against the French which could afterwards let them to attack the British. Therefore, the French were commanded to pull out their men from their positions. This further spoiled Anglo-French military relationship since Koeltz never wanted to withdraw his men before engaging in a fight.

On February 14th, the Germans attacked during a sandstorm. They quickly destroyed forty four American tanks, twenty six artillery guns and twenty two trucks. Anderson believed that the attack was a diversion to disguise an attack further north. Ironically, both Anderson and Arnim believed that any decisive battle would be fought much nearer along the coast of Tunisia, yet here they were fighting inland. They had to therefore initiate orders and troops to attack from the coast of Tunisia.

On 15th February, the Americans initiated a retaliate attack. By 17th February, they had already lost ninety eight more tanks, fifty seven semi tanks in addition to twenty nine artillery guns. While they withdrew, Americans on the other hand destroyed very important supplies except that the Germans were able to acquire critical five thousand gallons of aviation fuel in total. Rommel was instructed to attack Le Kef which was sixty miles north of Kasserine Pass. So as to invade this region, he was forced to move his troops via the Kasserine pass. General Alexander was allocated the authority over Andersons first Army along with Montgomerys eighth Army. General Alexander wobbled at the disorder he found in all regions that Allies controlled. He merely ordered for no withdrawals from whichever positions.

On 18th February, there was slight action on the frontage and this permitted the Allies to tense up their defenses. The coming of the ninth Artillery Division bolstered the morale in a great way. Between 19th and 22nd February, Rommel attempted to attain his goal - Le Kef. Nevertheless, he recognized that he had no means to initiate a consequential attack. Therefore, on   February 22nd Rommel authorized for the attack to be cancelled. His chief setback was the continuous lack of supply because men had already been withdrawn from the North of Africa to battle in Russian campaign. This had angered the Desert Fox and he pulled out from Kasserine Pass without the knowledge of the Allies who failed to pursue his retreat. Therefore, by 25th February the Kasserine Pass was under the control of the Allies. The Germans by now had been shoved back towards Eastern Dorsale.

Rommel had achieved a little elbow space in Tunisia, but he already had startled every Allied command centers inNorth Africa and taught them a good deal as regards to the art of battle. Considerable changes in preparation, doctrine, organization and weapons were as a result of this war.

The winners and losers
The battle in the Kasserine Pass eventually cost the Germans a total of 2,000 men in addition to approximately 10, 000 Allied soldiers, and 6,500 of who were Americans. Whereas the entire catastrophe had been forestalled, the Battle of Kasserine Pass was a very humiliating defeat to the United States forces. Their major foremost clash with Germans, the fight demonstrated an enemy dominance in practice and paraphernalia and exposed numerous faults in the American power structure and policy. After the battle, Rommel sacked American troops on the grounds of being ineffective and felt they did offer a threat to his command.