American History

It might seem counterintuitive to characterize John F. Kennedy as a peacemaker given his frequently severe anti-Communist rhetoric and the number of crises that his administration faced around the world.  An examination Kennedys determination to successfully conclude a Limited Test Ban Treaty with the Soviet Union, however clearly demonstrates that President Kennedy was both committed to a more stable type of global peace and that he was willing to make concessions despite such crises as those which occurred in Berlin and Cuba as well as a deep-seated fear of Soviet intentions and a fairly well-established belief that America suffered from a nuclear Missile Gap with respect to the Soviet Union.  These crises and these fears, in other leaders, may have resulted in an extraordinarily aggressive type of foreign policy in which the types of concessions made to the Soviet Union pursuant to the Limited Test Ban Treaty would have been deemed unthinkable and too risky.  John F. Kennedy, however, refused to succumb to these types of fears.  To be sure, he was highly suspicious of Soviet intentions and he considered them to be a global threat to freedom and democracy on the other hand, because Kennedy also believed that human reason and peace could prevail, he was daring and courageous enough to personally advocate and eventually consummate the signing of the Limited Test Ban Treaty with the Soviet Union in 1963.  In order to support this thesis, that Kennedy demonstrated courageous leadership in pursuit of peace, this paper will discuss the aura of fear and peril which affected American foreign policy toward the Soviet Union and how Kennedy transcended this fear in order to get the Limited Test Ban Treaty signed.

As an initial matter, it is quite fair to argue that President Kennedys first few years in office were marked by crisis and fear.  He was compelled by circumstances, and by Soviet actions, to focus disproportionately on foreign crises and Soviet threats to Americas national security.  He was confronted with the Berlin Crises in 1961 and the Cuban Missile Crises in 1962.  These crises involved direct confrontations with the Soviet Union, and the very real risk of nuclear escalation, and America to a certain extant seemed to be reacting defensively to an aggressive Soviet Union.  Distrust of the Soviet Union was high and the prospects for peace seemed distant at best.  Added to these crises, as is relevant to this paper, was a majority belief in the American foreign policy establishment to the effect that America was losing its nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union.  This came to be known as the Missile Gap concern and it originated with Kennedys predecessors in the Eisenhower administration and in the Pentagon.  It has been noted, for example, that The Soviet Union was closing the gap in nuclear technology and numbers of warheads available with the United States HYPERLINK httpwww.questiaschool.comPM.qstaod5001263890(Wenger  Gerber, 1999, p. 460).  The fear that an increasingly aggressive and expansionist Soviet Union was closing the missile gap caused conflicting priorities.  On the one hand, it would be in Americas interest to freeze Soviet advances in nuclear technology development through some type of arms control on the other hand, few in America trusted the Soviet Union and feared that the Soviets would never honor an arms control agreement.  President Eishenhower lost his opportunity to become the peacemaker when, in the aftermath of the U-2 incident, Khrushchev broke off all negotiations HYPERLINK httpwww.questiaschool.comPM.qstaod5001263890(Wenger  Gerber, 1999, p. 460).  It was within this very real context of fear and mistrust that John F. Kennedy became the President of the United States.

Although Kennedy had expressed his concern about the alleged Missile Gap before coming president, he was unable to secure an arms control agreement in his first few years because of the aforementioned crises and a lack of political will on behalf of both the United States and the Soviet Union.  Fear and confrontation prevailed and a meaningful arms control agreement remained elusive.  It has been noted that
Kennedys use of the missile gap issue was based on his conviction that the 1960s would represent a critical period in world history. He claimed that the international balance of power would shift in favor of the Soviet Union, and American policy had to reflect the new conditions HYPERLINK httpwww.questiaschool.comPM.qstaod5000522868(Meagher, 1997, p. 472)

Despite these very real challenges, President Kennedy consistently pursued arms control when international crises allowed and he persuaded Khrushchev to sign in order to bind the Soviet Union.  On-site inspections were demanded and agreed to under certain conditions and underground and atmospheric testing restrictions and band were agreed to by both countries.  Although both countries had previously adhered to very sporadic arms control agreements, frequently broken, John F. Kennedy established in the aftermath of the Cuban Missile crises the firmest arms control agreement up to that time and set the framework for future movements toward minor forms of peaceful cooperation between he worlds two superpowers.  Although the agreement was not perfect, it represented a step toward cooperation and peaceful coexistence rather than toward the potentially devastating type of confrontation threatened by the Cuban Missile Crisis.
 
In conclusion, John F. Kennedy prevailed in pursuing peace despite a pervasive sense of fear and mistrust.  He continued to pursue peace through arms control agreements with the Soviet Union despite the Berlin Crises of 1961 and the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962.  In this way, by finally signing the Limited Test Ban Treaty with the Soviet Union in 1963, President Kennedy truly transcended the fear and the mistrust.  This type of devotion to peace represents an important part of his legacy.