American History

    The firebombing of Germany and Japan during World War Two still stir controversy to this day. As historians attempt to put these events into perspective a single prevailing view about the bombings and their motivations has taken form. Individual perspectives on the reasons for the bombings in Japan vary however.

    Historians have used the firebombing of Tokyo in March, 1945 to establish a sort of dividing line. Civilians were now explicit targets of Allied bombing. Many historians see this as a point in which Allied policy changed, ultimately leading to the nuclear bombing of Japan later that year. Author Thomas R. Searle in It Made a Lot of Sense to Kill Skilled Workers The Firebombing of Tokyo in March 1945, takes a contrarian view.

    The bombings and the events that led up to them, in fact, did not represent a major change in Allied policy. It is only the spectacular nature of the bombings success that made them appear any different than the coinciding precision bombing campaign. This article appears in the January 2002 edition of The Journal of Military History.
Synopsis

    Searle begins a chronological and thematic analysis with the United States entry into the war in 1941. He refers briefly to planning made during the pre-war years, but his analysis is largely confined to the years 1941-45. The author discusses planning, execution and results of bombing in both Germany and Japan. Within this context the development of what would become the United States Air Force is outlined. A discussion of the B-29 bomber project and its effects on operations and policy is also presented.

    The authors two part thesis is clearly presented. In the first part he argues that most historians are misrepresenting the firebombing of Tokyo as being indicative of a major shift in U.S. within that framework he offers a secondary and more provocative point - The massive civilians casualties suffered from the firebombing were far from being collateral damage. Searle claims that civilian casualties were not accidental or incidental, but an explicit goal of the incendiary raids on Japanese cities 1

    The death of civilians and the destruction of industry were primary goals of the attacks. This was well-known, assessed and planned for years earlier by the military. Therefore, the targeting of civilians was not a major shift in policy. The author also attempts to debunk many historians notion that the primary reason for the firebombing was the destruction of Japanese morale. The author cites more tactically-related goals as motivation for the firebombing of heavily populated areas.

    The topic is primarily discussed from a military perspective. Political, social and moral aspects are mentioned, but only in the context of the progress of the military campaign. Much of the authors research comes from internal military sources and documents.

The B-29 and the Development of the United States Air Force
    World War One had seen the early emergence of military air power. In the Second World War, the potential of air power was being fulfilled. At the time air power assets were under the command and control of the United States Army air commanders were growing restless under that control. A growing number felt that an autonomous Air Force was both justified and necessary. Establishment of a new military branch would not be easy. An act of Congress and a separate funding stream would be required. During the war air Generals were eager to provide justification for such an expansion. Bombing was one way in which this could be done. Searle writes If USAAF strategic bombing could make a major contribution to the war effort it would provide a powerful argument for the service autonomy U.S. airmen had sought for decades 2

    The determination of how to judge success in bombing was still a work in progress for the USAAF at this stage. A targeted bombing of a factory in Essen, for example, may or may not be successful in furthering strategic goals. Was the factory taken out completely Was it a redundant facility Was there a cost in terms of Allied men or materiel These were all questions commanders had to answer during the heat of war. Answering them often involved getting accurate intelligence from the theater.

    In Germany precision bombing campaigns had been combined with incendiary area bombing to maximize effects. During that campaign it was apparent that precision bombing of industry was not always as effective as was hoped. The results of incendiary bombing were quite obvious as entire German cities burned to the ground. An incendiary campaign within a larger strategic bombing plan for Japan had been in the works for quite some time. Urban incendiary bombing was not LeMays idea or even his primary goal, he just made it work spectacularly well. 3

    The B-29 project was a major undertaking for the United States military which cost more than the Manhattan Project or any other military aircraft to date. According to Searle, the massive investment in the B-29 cast its own shadow on U.S. policy and operations. The author unfolds his thesis within this backdrop.

    The B-29 project represented more than just the building of a new aircraft for the United States military. In certain ways the project was so massive as to shape U.S. Army Air Force (USAAF) policy and the ways it was carried out. Searle cites USAAF documents that refer to the project as the three billion dollar gamble. 4 Unlike its predecessors, the plane go straight from the production line into combat without substantial testing. The potential advantages of the plane included pressurized cockpits, increased payloads and increased range. The latter was particularly important because Allied bases were located far from mainland targets.

    Searle ties the fate of the B-29 into his thesis by stepping back and looking at the larger picture. The USAAF was trying to establish itself as an autonomous branch of the military. In the eyes of USAAF officials, Searle contends, the success of this budget-busting project was essential to proving the viability of the air forces.

    The precision bombing campaign in Japan had been sluggishly moving along without demonstrable success. An incendiary campaign flown by the B-29s would be the quickest way to generate headline-grabbing success. incendiary area bombing had already been done in Germany and its potential effects in Japan had been well-researched.

    When the B-29 came on-line the USAAF wanted complete autonomy on how to use it. Searle describes the creation of the Twentieth Air Force as a direct offshoot of the B-29 project. The Twentieth Air Force reported directly to the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. In other words, the highest levels of the U.S. government were aware of incendiary bombing plans as early as 1943.

    The replacement of Gen. Hansell with Gen Curtis LeMay before the firebombing is often cited by historians as evidence of a major policy shift. Searle argues that Hansell was replaced because of competency issues, not policy disputes between pro and anti-bombing factions. Furthermore, Searle presents evidence that contradicts morale bombing as a primary focus of the March 1945 attacks. He cites a report to the Joint Chiefs of staff in 1944 that did not specifically mention Japanese morale as a target of firebombing. 5

    The author criticizes prevailing historical points of view in general. Only one specific historian is singled out. Searle cites author Michael S. Sherry. According to Sherry the incremental way by which new assumptions crept into planning obscured the shift in target priority toward urban areas. 6 Searle does not disagree with the first part of Sherrys thesis. He does not believe that there was there was a demonstrable shift in targeting policy however. For reasons both tactical and self-serving the USAAF had long planned to do this type of bombing.

Analysis and Conclusion
    Searle makes a strong case that the firebombing of Tokyo and the de facto targeting of civilians was simply a continuation of USAAF policy and not a radical shift. His sources include many USAAF documents from the period, post-war military reviews and books written by the actual participants in the events he describes.

    Most of the sources for the article are primary. Since the article focuses on a historical event, sources from the time period are appropriate. Any potential biases come from over-usage of internal military sources. The article tends to take a somewhat narrow military perspective.
In two areas the author could have fleshed out his thesis more. First, an important part of his original thesis is his contention that historians have fundamentally misinterpreted the firebombing of Tokyo. At one point he complains that. these historical works need to be revised or abandoned entirely. 7 A list of books is provided in the footnotes but precious few specific references are made to where the other historians are going wrong.

    In this case a more substantial literature review may be called for. This could also have provided a wider social, ethical and political perspective on the events. Secondly, the conclusion is very short. There are several disparate parts of the information that could have been tied together more effectively.

    The article is targeted toward military and historical scholars. Its readability would also make it of interest to a  more general audience interested in history. It is clearly written and not difficult to read.

    A chilling  implication of the authors thesis is that Japanese civilians were always a target of U.S. bombing plans. A deputy to U.S. General Hap Arnold said that It made a lot of sense to kill skilled workers by burning whole areas. 8  In fact a large part of the reason for bombing industrial centers was to eliminate skilled workers. Allied Generals knew that industrial plants were more easily replaceable than were the skilled workers who ran them. This is one of the many terrible calculations made during a World War. From that perspective it is terrible but entirely logical that the USAAF would plan to firebomb civilians for strategic, not morale, reasons.

    The assumption that civilian bombings were conducted to destroy the morale of the Japanese people has always been questionable. The Japanese, having already been at war with China, were war-hardened and indoctrinated by the Emperor to self-sacrifice for the greater cause. The USAAF was well aware of all this. They would have not have been foolish enough to make morale a primary target of firebombing.

    Searle uses the B-29 project and the development of the U.S. Air Force obliquely to support his thesis. How these led directly to the firebombing of civilians is somewhat murky. Did the USAAF need some spectacular success with the B-29 to establish itself as an independent force By that time it was clear to most that air power was the wave of the future. Tactics and equipment were evolving rapidly. In 1945 it was highly likely that an independent Air Force would be necessary in the near future.